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Abstract 
Thought suppression increases the persistence of unwanted idiosyncratic worries 
thoughts when individuals try to suppress them. The failure of suppression may 
contribute to the development and maintenance of emotional disorders. Depressive 
people seem particulary prone to engage in unsuccessful mental control strategies such 
as thought suppression. Worry has been reported to be elevated in depressed individuals 
and a dysphoric mood may also contribute for the failure of suppression. No studies 
examine, however, the suppression of worisome thoughts in individuals with depressive 
symptoms.  To investigate the suppression effects of worrisome thoughts, 46 
participants were selected according to the cut-off score of a depressive 
symptomatology scale and they were divided in two groups (subclinical and nonclinical 
group). All the individuals took part in an experimental paradigm of thought 
suppression. The results of the mixed factorial analysis of variance revealed an 
increased frequency of worrisome thoughts during the suppression phase on depending 
of the depressive symptoms. These findings confirm that depressive mood can reduce 
the success of suppression.  
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Thought suppression is defined as the effort not to think about a particular thought 
(Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). This is one of the most used mental 
control strategies to control unwanted negative thoughts (Iijima & Tanno, 
2012). Paradoxically, however, suppression can increase the intrusiveness of the 
thoughts intended to be suppressed (Muris, Merckelbach, & Horselenberg, 1996). 
Wegner et al. (1987) found that the suppression of unwanted white bear thoughts led 
to an intensification of the suppressed thoughts in a post-suppression period (rebound 
effect). Lavy and van den Hout (1990) also reported an immediate enhancement effect 
during the thought suppression period when individuals were not allowed to use 
distraction.  
In order to explain the paradoxical effects of thought suppression, Wegner (1994) 
developed the ironic processes theory of mental control. This theory proposes the 
existence of two simultaneous mechanisms in thought suppression: (1) an intentional 
operating process (IOP) that performs a voluntary and conscious search for alternative 
thoughts (with the purpose of replacing suppression target thoughts and distract 
unwanted thoughts); and (2) an ironic monitoring process (IMP), automatic and 
unconscious, that constantly examines possible failures in the IOP. The IOP is 
responsible for trying to produce efforts to achieve the desired mental state. For this 
purpose, the operating process needs intensive resources. In case of adjusted cognitive 
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resources, thought suppression may not only fail but also prompt the opposite effect, the 
rebound effect. A dysphoric mood could also hamper the suppression process, resulting 
in higher ironic effects (Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993). 
According some authors (e.g., Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988; Wenzlaff, 2005), 
depressed individuals are more likely than non-depressed individuals to suffer the ironic 
effects of suppression due to three main reasons: (a) depressed individuals depend more 
often on distractors emotionally associated with unwanted thoughts; (b) a depressed 
mood may consume resources of the operating process; and (c) depressed individuals 
often experience high levels of subjective stress that can minimize the ability to use 
distraction effectively. 
Wenzlaff et al. (1988) conducted a study with the objective of examine the skills 
and strategies used by depressed individuals to suppress thoughts. The results of this 
study were that: (a) depressed individuals use distractors with essentially negative 
content; (b) they display increased difficulties in thought suppression due to the use of 
memories related to their unwanted thoughts as a distraction strategy; and (c) they seem 
to reveal a deficit in the ability to suppress unwanted negative thoughts, experiencing a 
resurgence of suppressed thoughts as a result of suppression attempts (Wenzlaff et al., 
1988). 
On the other hand, worry is a transdiagnostic process across depressive and 
generalized anxiety disorders (Kircanski, Thompson, Sorenson, Sherdell, & Gotlib, 
2015). The suppression of worrisome thoughts also seems to give rise to paradoxical 
effects (Becker, Rinck, Roth, & Margraf, 1998) and, at the same time, the perceived 
failure of thought suppression effort produces an increase of worry associated with the 
failure of suppression (Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes, & Scott, 1999).  
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Iijima and Tanno (2012) conducted a research that aimed to investigate the 
moderating effect of trait worry on the success of thought suppression related to 
everyday worries. These authors found that by suppressing their daily worries, 
individuals with high levels of trait worry reported higher rebound effect levels than 
individuals with low levels of trait worry. 
In conclusion, the tendency towards excessive worry seems to be a transdiagnosis 
construct common to some anxiety and mood disorders. Thought suppression is a 
strategy commonly used by individuals to cope with their unpleasant thoughts 
(including worry); paradoxically, however, this may contribute for the development and 
maintenance of such disorders. Suppressing thoughts seems to be a difficult task that 
can be even more difficult if individuals are under dysphoric emotional states. The 
strategies employed to suppress unpleasant thoughts seem to contribute to the 
suppression success (i.e., reduction/elimination of the thought to suppress) or failure 
(i.e., increased frequency of the thought to suppress both during and after suppression). 
Given this rationale, we aimed to replicate and extend the paradigm developed by 
Iijima and Tanno (2012) in depressed and non-depressed participants. With this 
experimental manipulation, we expect that: (a) paradoxical effects (immediate 
enhancement and rebound) derive from thought suppression; (b) occurrence of higher 
ironic processes in the depression group; (c) the nonclinical group present a wider range 
of resources to deal with the worries; and (d) during the suppression phase, the use of 
positive, neutral or negative but not related with the most worrisome target thoughts 
will depend on depressive state. 
 





Forty six Portuguese participants rating in age from 18 to 65 years (M = 43.91, SD 
= 10.81) took part of the experiment. Most of the participants were female (69.60%), 
married or living in common law (39.10%) and of middle socioeconomic status 
(56.50%). Concerning to education level, most of the participants hold 12 (32.60%) or 
15 (23.90%) years of school.  
Participants were recruited from the general population through informal invitation 
(personal contacts and social networks). The study protocol was approved by the 
Scientific Committee of the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences of our University. 
 
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990; Portuguese version Jiménez-Ros, 2011) 
The PSWQ measures the general tendency to excessive worry.  Each item consists 
of five levels of response, in which 1 represents “Not typical at all” and 5 “Very 
typical”. The Portuguese version of the PSWQ-16 items, used in this study, showed an 
internal consistency of α = .88, suggesting a good reliability (Jiménez-Ros, 2011). The 
internal consistency obtained from the sample in this study was acceptable (α = .74). 
 
2.2.2. Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983; 
Portuguese version Pais-Ribeiro et al., 2007) 
HADS is a 14 items scale with five response levels ranging from 0 to 3. HADS is 
divided into two subscales each of them with seven itens: The anxiety subscale (HADS-
A) and the depression subscale (HADS-D).  In the present study, we used the HADS-D. 
Scores between 0 and 7 were considered "normal", between 8 and 10 "average", 
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between 11 and 14 "moderate", and between 15 and 21 "severe". The Portuguese 
version of the HADS showed a good internal consistency for the depression scale (α = 
.81) (Pais-Ribeiro et al., 2007). The internal consistency obtained for this study was 
acceptable (α = .73). 
2.3. Procedure 
The participants signed informed consent, completed a socio-demographic 
questionnaire, the PSWQ and the HADS-D. Participants were informed that there would 
be three phases of thought verbalisation but no mention were made that the experience 
would be related to thought or worry suppression. 
We used the HADS-D to screen participants: those who scored above or equal a cut-
off score of eight were considered for the subclincal group (SG; n = 24) and the 
participants who scored below of eight for the nonclinical (NG; n = 22). 
The final sample of 46 was invited to participate in a laboratory experiment. 
Participants completed the different phases of the study in a quiet room, seated in a 
comfortable chair and facing the computer screen.  
Similarly to Iijima and Tanno’s (2012), in our study, participants trained for a three 
minuts period before the experiment. We asked them to write down a word or phrase 
that was describing their thoughts when the computer randomly displayed a sound for 
three times. We programed the Psychopy 2 (Peirce, 2007) to produce the sounds.   
Once concluded the training period, the experiment was run in three phases (initial 
expression, suppression and final expression).  During the initial expression phase 
(IEP), we asked the participants to write their thoughts whenever they heard the sound 
(exactly as they did during the training period). The computer randomly made a sound 
10 times over a period of 10 minutes and the time gap between two consecutive sounds 
was 40 to 80 seconds.  
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After the first phase, the investigator ask the participants to describe their most 
distressing worrisome thought during the last five days and rate it regarding three 
aspects: (1) “It’s a difficult subject to handle”; (2) “I feel depressed when I think of it”; 
and (3) “I think regularly on this matter”, according to a 7-point scale ranging from 1 
(Completely disagree) to 7 (Completely agree).  
After that, the investigator asked the participants to rate the similarity between the 
content of their more most distressing worrisome thought and the content of the 
spontaneuous thoughts described in the first experimental phase according to a scale 
with four categories: (1) “This thought is equal to the thought that has worried me 
during the last days”; (2) “This thought has to do with another matter but is also 
fundamentally related to worries or negative thoughts”; (3) “This thought has to do with 
another matter primarily related to neutral or positive themes”; and (4) “I had my mind 
blank”. 
Once completed these two tasks, in the suppression phase (SP), we asked 
the  participants to not to think about their most distressing worrisome thought and to 
write down, again, a word or phrase that reflected what they were thinking when they 
heard the computer sound. Again, the computer randomly made a sound 10 times over a 
period of 10 minutes. We requested the classification of their thoughts in accordance 
with the previous rating scale. 
During the final expression phase (FEP), the participants could think about whatever 
they like. We just required the participants to write down a word or phrase that reflected 
what they were thinking every time they heard the computer sound, which was again 10 
times over a period of 10 minutes. After that, the participants rated their contents 
thoughts according to the scale used in the previous phases. 
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After the experience, we proceeded to an interview to assess the participants’ 
subjective perception about the success, difficulty, and effort spent to suppress their 
most distressing worrisome thought, as well as the strategies used to suppress the 
thought. The experience finished with a debriefing about the study objectives. 
2.4. Statistical analysis 
The data were processed with the IBM SPSS software (version 22.0).  
The relative frequency of the worrisome target thought was calculated in each phase 
(i.e., number of thoughts ranked with 1/10). If the supresssion was successful, relative 
frequency of 1 was low. That means, participant’ spontaneous thoughts were not related 
with their most distressing worrisome thought. If the suppression was not successful, 
relative frequency was higher, meaning that the participant thought about their most 
distressing worrisome thought during all the 10 minutes of the suppression phase.  
To verify if paradoxical effects of the suppression of idiosyncratic recent daily 
worries depended on depressive symptoms was performed a mixed ANOVA (3x2).  The 
between groups factor was the depressive symptoms (SG vs. NG) and the within factor 
was the three experimental phases (IEP, SP, FEP).  
For the SP, we also calculated the relative frequency of negative but not related with 
the target worrisome thoughs and the relative frequency of positive and neutral thoughts 
(i.e., number of thoughts ranked with 2/10 and 3/10). Low levels of this frequencies 
means that, during this phase, the participants did not evoque other negative/positive or 
neutral thoughts to suppress their most distressing worrisome thought. By the opposite, 
high values (near of 1), means that the participants thought abouts negative/positive and 
neutral thoughts issues to supress their most worrisome thoughts. To verify if during the 
SP, the use of positive, neutral or negative but not related with the most worrisome 
target thoughts will depend on depressive state, we used the relative frequency of 
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negative and the relative frequency of positive and neutral thoughts as a factor whithin 
in a ANOVA (2x2) and the factor between groups was the depressive symptoms. 
The partial eta squared (ƞp
2) was used to estimate the effect size, being values lower 
than .010 small effect magnitudes,  between .058 and .13 average magnitudes, and 
higher than .13 large magnitudes (Cohen, 1973).  
To compare the significance of the differences between two average values for 
independent samples was used a t-test and was considered the value Cohen’s d for the 
effect size estimation. The values of d equal to .2 were considered small effect 
magnitudes, the values of  .5 which were average magnitudes, and the ones higher than 
.7 were considered large magnitudes (Cohen, 1988). 
To compare the significance of the differences between two average values for 
dependent samples was also used a t-test. The magnitude of the difference were 
calculated using the following formula: r =  ²²  (Field, 2009). The results of the 
magnitude of the effect were interpreted according to the criteria suggested by the 
author, where .10 is a weak association, .30 is an average association, and .50 is a strong 
association. 
 
3. Results  
 
3.1. Manipulation checks 
The subclinical group show a significative (t(43) = 2.158, p = .037, d = .66) 
tendency to pathological worry (M = 53.83, SD = 9.45) when compared with the 
nonclinical group (M = 47.95, SD = 8.76).   
We classified the content of the recent daily worries reported by the participants 
into three themes (academic and labour issues, interpersonal relationships, health and 
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welfare). The performed chi-square test indicated that these themes were not associated 
with the depressive symptoms groups (χ2(2) = .773, p = .680). 
Both groups differed significantly in the frequency of experience their most 
distressing worrisome thought (t(44) = 2.954, p = .005), in the difficulty to support 
them (t(44) = 2.893, p = .006, d = .87), and also in the depressive feelings caused by 
it (t(44) = 2.954, p = .005, d = .89). The subclinical group presented higher mean values 
than the nonclinical group in frequency of the most distressing worrisome thought (M = 
6.21, SD = .93 vs. M = 5.27, SD = 1.83), in the difficulty experienced to support it (M = 
5.29, SD = 1.37 vs. M = 3.95, SD = 1.80), and in the depressive feelings caused by these 
kind of worries (M = 4.83, SD = 1.86 vs. M = 3.09, SD = 2.14). 
The worry trait was not associated with the assessment of most distressing 
worrisome thought neither in the subclinical group (rdifficulty = .028, n.s; rdysphoria = - .196, 
n.s; rfrequency = .020; n.s) nor in the nonclinical group (rdifficulty = .349, n.s; rdysphoria = .216, 
n.s; rfrequency = .399; n.s). 
 
3.2. The paradoxical effect of suppression depends from the depressive symptoms 
A mixed ANOVA was performed (3x2) to check whether the paradoxical effects 
(immediate enhancement and rebound) of the suppression of the most distressing 
worrisome thought depended on the depressive symptoms (subclinical group vs. 
nonclinical group). The results suggest that the paradoxical effect of the suppression 
depends on the depressive symptoms levels (F[1.690, 74.363] = 3.134, p = .058; ƞp
2 = 
.066). Although, there were no differences concerning the frequency of the target 
thought due to depressive symptoms (F[1, 44] = 1.043; p = .313; ηp
2 = .023), the 
occurrence of the most distressing worrisome thought depends from the experimental 
phases (F[1.690, 74.363] = 3.529; p = .042; ηp
2 = .074). 
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The visual inspection of the Figure 1 suggests that the evolution of the occurrence of 
the most distressing worrisome thought in the three experimental phases is 
differentiated on the basis of the depressive symptoms.   
 
 
Fig. 1 Evolution of the relative frequency of worrisome thoughts in the three experimental phases, 
according to the depressive symptoms (SG vs. NG) 
In the subclinical group there was a significant increase in the occurrence of the 
worrisome target thought (t(23) = -3.757, p = .001;   .016 with Bonferroni correction; r 
= .62) from the IEP (M = .16, SD = .20) to the SP (M = .31, SD = .22);  we further 
observed a decrease in the frequency of worries from the SP to the FEP (M = .24, SD 
= .23) that was not significant (t(23) = 1.690, p = .105, r = .33). We also found that the 
increasing of the frequency of worries from the IEP to the FEP was not significant (t(23) 
= -1.284, p = .212, r = .25). In the nonclinical group the occurrence of the most 
worrisome thought was very similar in the three experimental phases. There was a non-
significant increase (t(21) = -.137,  p = .892, r = .003) of the occurrence of the worrisome 
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target thought from the IEP (M = .17, SD = .05) to the SP (M = .173, SD = .06); in the 
FEP it was registered an average value (M = .17, SD = .06) similar to the one found in 
the IEP.  
These results suggest that the depression levels moderated the immediate 
enhancement suppression effects regarding the worries, namely (a) in subclinical group, 
the suppression increases the immediate occurrence of the worrisome target thought 
during the SP; and (b) in nonclinical group, suppression does not affect the occurrence 
of this thoughts. 
 
 
3.3. Affective valence (negative vs. positive) of thoughts during suppression phase 
(SP) 
 In the SP, the affective valence (negative vs. positive) of thoughts which the 
participants had when they were asked to suppress the most distressing worrisome 
thought depends on depressive symptoms group (F[1, 1] = 3.099; p = .085; ηp
2 = 
.066). The visual inspection of the graph (Figure 2) and the analysis of multiple 
comparisons (  .025, after Bonferroni correction) suggests that, although, there is 
more positive thougths in boths groups, in the subclinical group the suppression of an 
worrisome thought did not lead to the occurrence of significant differences between 
negative thoughts and positive thoughts (t(23) = - 2.003, p = .054, r = .39); yet, the 
nonclinical group presented significantly (t(21) = - 3.545, p = .002, r = .61) more 





Fig 2 Relative frequency of positive and negative thoughts in the worry suppression phase, according to the depressive symptoms 
3.4. Perception of difficulty, effort and success in the suppression phase (SP) 
Groups did not differ neither in the perception of difficulty (t(44) = -.680, p 
= .500, d = -.21) nor in the perception of effort expended to suppress the recent daily 
worries (t(44) = -.200, p = .842, d = -.06). Nonetheless, the perception of the success was 
significantly higher for the subclinical group (t(44) = -3.141,  p = .003, d = - .95) 




3.5. Strategies used to cope with the most distressing worrisome thoughts in the 
suppression phase (SP) 
Our data suggest that there was an association between the type of strategies 
used in the SP to cope with the worrisome thoughts and the groups (χ2(2)
 = 11.127, p = 
.004). The subclinical group used more cognitive distraction strategies (91.7%), while 






Thought suppression is a strategy commonly used by individuals to cope with 
their unpleasant thoughts (including worry). The effectiveness of this strategy to reduce 
unwanted thought frequency is still unclear. To achive this success seems to be more 
difficult if individuals are under dysphoric emotional states. Our main objective was to 
test if the success of an idiosincratic worrisome thought suppression may be more 
difficult under depressive mood. We are also interested to know the most efficient 
strategies used by the participants to reduce unwanted worrisome thoughts frequency.  
In the current study, we used an experiment to suppression considering 
idiosyncratic worries and to examine the effects of suppressing worrisome thoughts in 
individuals with and without depressive symptoms. 
As expected, we found an association between the presence in trait worry and 
depression (e.g., McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013; Starcevic et al., 2007). 
The subclincal group showed a higher tendency for excessive worry than the nonclinical 
group. 
Although there were no differences in the contents of the most distressing 
worrisome thoughts experienced by the participants during the days preceding the 
experience (according on the level of depressive symptoms), the subclinical group rated 
their primary worry as more frequent, harder to bear and more responsible for dysphoria 
(when compared to the nonclinical). This result can be explained by metacognitive 
models that consider the differences between normal and pathological worry as the 
result of metacognitive beliefs about the same (evaluation of thought, ability to monitor 
and regulate) rather than the differences in the content of thought (Wells & Matheus, 
1996). It was not associated, however, to the trait of excessive worry, presented in a 
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greater extent by the subclinical group. This result provides evidence for Wegner’s 
(1994) perspective, which considers that the suppression affects the occurrence of 
worrisome thoughts but not the worrisome process itself. 
Our results also showed a paradoxical immediate enhancement effect associated 
to depressive symptoms, and the participants with depressive symptoms presented a 
higher frequency of thoughts related with their idiosyncratic worry during 
suppression. This may means that high levels of active negative mood in individuals can 
deplete the cognitive resources required for suppression (Purdon, 1999). Similar results 
were obtained by Wegner et al. (1987) and Ashton and Boschen (2011). These authors 
found that the suppression of unwanted thoughts leads to an immediate enhancement 
effect on the occurrence of such thought; they further demonstrated that the presence of 
depressive symptoms has an effect on the failure to suppress worrisome thoughts during 
the SP. Our findings are also consistent with the results of the study conducted by 
Conway et al. (1991), who found that, when instructed to suppress thoughts, dysphoric 
individuals had a higher rate of unwanted thoughts than non-dysphoric 
individuals. Depressed mood seems to threaten the suppression, allowing unwanted 
thoughts to return to mind immediately. 
Contrary to our predictions, there was no rebound effect; thus, the worrisome 
thoughts do not seem to return to consciousness once the attempt to suppress them is 
completed. Our results suggest that, when individuals with dysphoric mood try to 
suppress a worrisome thought, such attempts become unfruitful only for a short 
time. Similar results were obtained by Koster, Soetens, Braet, and Raedt (2008), who 




The failure to suppress worrisome thoughts is perceived realistically by the 
participants with depressive symptoms who assessed a minor success to suppress their 
idiosyncratic worries than participants without depressive symptoms; yet, they did not 
differ from these latter neither in the effort perceived nor in the difficulty experienced to 
suppress the worry. 
As Murray, Anderson, and Kensinger (2015) concluded in their two experimental 
studies (comparision memories suppression between young and elderly adults), the 
failure of the participants’ memory suppression appears to be more associated with the 
failure to select inhibitory strategies than with the incapacity to implement such 
strategies. In our study, the failure of thought suppression in individuals with depressive 
symptoms may be related to the type of strategies used to supress the thoughts. In fact, 
the nonclinical group used a more diverse range of strategies to suppress thoughts 
(cognitive distraction, behavioural and do nothing), whilst participants with depressive 
symptoms used mainly the cognitive distraction. Furthermore, the contents of the 
selected thoughts to implement the distraction during the SP were also different. The 
participants with depressed mood used more often thoughts with negative content than 
the participants without depressive symptoms. These results are consistent with those 
found by Wenzlaff et al. (1988) and may help to explain some results obtained by these 
authors, who found, in a longitudinal study (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998), an association 
between suppression and high levels of rumination. In a later investigation they further 
found that the suppression efforts may, ironically, lead to depressive rumination 
(Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003). To confirm these results, future studies are required to 
manipulate the repertoires of strategies and the content of distractors during the 
worrisome thought suppression in individuals with or without depression. 
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Notwithstanding the relevance of our results, we faced some limitations during the 
development of this study that did not allow us to draw more general inferences from 
the data. Some aspects to highlight are the following: (1) the small size of the sample; 
(2) the heterogeneous group with clinical symptoms; (3) the use of self-report measures 
may have biased the research results; and (4) finally, and although we did not find an 
association between the tendency for excessive worry and the individuals’ evaluation 
about their most distressing worrisome thought, this variable may have influenciated the 
results. 
Future research may replicate this study using more homogeneous samples and with 
diagnosed depression and a superior and representative sample size of the population 
would allow greater external validity. We also suggested control the role of the variable 
trait worry in the suppression of worrisome thoughts in individuals with depressive 
symptoms. 
Despite of these limitations, this study is believed to provide valuable insights about 
a field of increased importance and with clinical and scientific interest. These insights 
are refered in particularly to the paradoxical effect of immediate enhancement during 
thought suppression and the importance of negative mood in the suppression of 
unwanted worrisome thoughts. The participants with depressive symptoms are aware of 
the failure of thought suppression; yet, they neither assign this task a greater difficulty 
nor consider making a higher effort than those without depressive symptoms. The lack 
of diversity strategies and the negative content of the distractors used by the individuals 
with depressive symptoms may have contributed to the suppression failure. The use of 
suppression and the type of strategies used to suppress worrisome thoughts can 
contribute to an increase of rumination and negative mood in these individuals. These 
results may inform clinicians about the importance of increasing (in therapeutic 
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interventions with depressed individuals or with dysphoric mood) the repertoire of 
coping strategies and changing the contents of distractor thoughts to address the worry. 
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